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Neoliberalism and the Collapse 
of the Soviet Bloc
The article addresses the process o f  neoliberal transformation 
o f the Soviet Bloc in the late 1980-ties and early 1990-ties as 
analyzed on the example o f Poland. Its trajectory generally 
confirms Loi'c Wacquant’s thesis put forward in his article 
Three steps to a historical anthropology o f actually existing 
neoliberalism, that neoliberalism tends to rather capture and 
use than simply dismantle and weaken state structures and 
power mechanisms. The author shows that the transition 
from planned to market economy in the former Soviet Bloc 
was also accompanied, backed and made possible by power­
ful ideological operations that reshaped the construction o f 
subjectivity and made it compatible with the neoliberal 
capitalism. This proves that two modes o f  analyzing neolibe­
ralism -  structural analysis o f  state power and focus on 
governmentality -  should be treated as complimentary tools 
o f understanding neoliberal transitions. However, contrary to 
Wacquant, the author claims that in this respect there is 
nothing new about neoliberalism as a practice, since capita­
lism has always required a help from the state to maintain 
a seemingly autonomous rule o f  the market.
Key w ords: neoliberalism, governmentality, transformation, transition 




From Lenin to Reagan
There’s a huge steelworks plant near the place I was born in southern 
Poland. It was designed and built by the Soviets right after World War 
II to serve a dual purpose: the first was to boost the industrial capacity 
of the country ruined by the war. The Soviets applied in their Bloc the 
same logic of development through heavy industrialization that was 
established in the USSR in the frame of NEP in 1921. But the steelworks 
was also intended to be a device of social engineering. It was built near 
Krakow, the medieval capital of Poland, once a vibrant artistic and 
intellectual center with a university that was established in 1364 and 
educated throughout the ages such scholars as Nicolaus Copernicus in 
the 15th century and Bronisław Malinowski in early 20th. This histo-
rical aura gave Krakow a bourgeois-aristocratic character that Stalin tried 
to fight by boosting the city’s working class. Thus the steelworks was 
designed to be a huge plant: it employed 50 thousand people (the entire 
population of Krakow was around 400 thousand at that time) and 
produced 6,7 million tons of steel per annum during its peak perfor-
mance throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Despite this huge effort the 
Soviet social plan didn’t really work – although the district built next to 
the plant has technically been a part of Krakow for more than half 
a century now, it has never really integrated with the city and has func-
tioned as a satellite town ever since1.
After the 1989 collapse of so-called “communism”, the plant, as well 
as the entire district, rapidly suffered from social and economic degra-
dation. Poland, like the rest of the Soviet Bloc, went through a deindu-
strialization that took its toll, first and foremost, on heavy industry. The 
steelworks went almost bankrupt by the end of the 1990s. It managed 
to survive only by drastically reducing its staff and output. Then, in 
2004, it was bought by Ispat International, a company founded and 
run by the richest Indian – Lakshmi Mittal. After changing its name 
and merging with Arcelor to form ArcelorMittal, the corporation now 
controls 70% of Poland’s steel industry. From a failed tool of Stalinist 
social engineering, the steelworks has thus become a toy of global capi-
talism. It currently employs only 3,5 thousand people and produces 
under 1,5 million tons of steel annually.
1 Industriestadtfuturismus: 100 Jahre Wolfsburg/Nowa Huta, eds. M. Kaltwasser, 
E. Majewska, K. Szreder, Frankfurt am Main 2007.
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The statue of Lenin on the main square of Nowa Huta decorated for the 1st of May 
in 1978
That is, however, only half of the story. An even more symptomatic 
transformation has taken place on a rather symbolic level. The plant 
was first called Vladimir Lenin Steelworks and there was a huge statue 
of Lenin overlooking the Central Square of the Nowa Huta district. The 
original town’s design was an urban and architectural masterpiece. Built 
next to the huge industrial plant in the middle of nowhere, among 
agricultural fields and inhabited by migrants from the countryside who 
had become workers in the plant, this renaissance-like modernist “city 
of gardens” – as it was called because of its parks and meadows – was 
s symbol of the social emancipation and economic development of 
a backward Central European country destroyed by the war. In harmony 
with this vision, Lenin was depicted by the statue in a dynamic, almost 
sublime way: walking in a long coat with his hands crossed behind his 
back. By the mid-1990s the steelworks was almost dead, most of its 
former workers unemployed, and the statue long torn down. However, 
this symbolic void did not linger for a long time. The Central Square 
got a new name in 2004 to celebrate the person who – as most Poles 
believe – along with John Paul II and Lech Walesa, destroyed the Soviet 
Empire and helped to establish capitalism in its former realm: it was 




Master plan of Nowa Huta. Contemporary satellite photo
The end of history
It is impossible to not see the deeply ironic character of this symbolic 
twist. The main social force opposing the Soviet regime in Poland appe-
ared in the scene of history as a workers movement: the trade union 
Solidarność (Solidarity). At its peak between August 1980 and Decem-
ber 1981 with 10 million members it was, of course, more than just 
a working class movement, but its original force stemmed from protests 
of industrial workers. This very same class was the one to pay the biggest 
price for the capitalist transformation of the early 1990-s2 and Nowa 
Huta – the town built around the steelwork that fired 90% of its employ-
ees – was the place, where social and economic degradation caused by 
the new neoliberal regime was felt as strong as it could have been. And 
with the plant itself overtaken by international capital, the workers were 
literally dispossessed of something that was supposed to be a tool of 
their emancipation. Yet, the very same people decided to name the 
central square of their community after the man who was one of the 
fiercest advocates of the very logic of this dispossession. What it clearly 
shows, is that the biggest winner of the cold war was not the oppressed 
citizens of the former Soviet Bloc, who got freed from a domination of 
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the Bolshevik Russia, and neither the so called West, but neoliberal 
capitalism itself. As I’ll try to show, this victory was an important – 
maybe even decisive – step in the genealogy of the contemporary neo-
liberal order in its social, economic and ideological dimension.
Of course, Poles were not the only people in the former Soviet Bloc 
who fully embraced the capitalist mode of production with all its social, 
cultural and economic consequences. In early 1990, world media repor-
ted on the opening of the first McDonald’s restaurant in Moscow. The 
event was attended by virtually tens of thousands of people hungry – 
physically, but also ideologically – to get a McMeal that represented 
for them freedom, modernity and, ironically, wealth of the capitalist 
world. The restaurant achieved an instant success and, according to 
“The New York Times”, it not only became the busiest McDonalds in 
the world on the first day of its service, but kept this rank continuously 
in the following decades3. 
The opening of the first McDonalds restaurants on Pushkin Square in Moscow in 
1990
It’s not only an astonishing economic fact, but also an incredible achie-
vement in the field of social communication. McDonald’s capitalized 
on a reputation it had in the former Soviet Bloc long before it even 
3 E.E. Arvedlund, McDonald’s Commands a Real Estate Empire in Russia, 




dreamed of opening a restaurant there. The same was true for all other 
major world brands in any branch of industry. There was no need for 
them to create a demand by means of marketing and advertising. The 
demand – or even lust – was already there. Contrary to the market 
realities of highly developed capitalist countries, where a manufacturer 
has to create a need, demand and awareness for the product, in the 
former “communist” countries, the capitalist merchandise made a huge 
PR career even before anyone seriously planned to sell it on their mar-
kets. This was achieved even before there was any kind of real market 
at all. This symbolic victory of McDonald’s is a good synecdoche of the 
entire ideological twist that took place with the fall of the Soviet Bloc 
and the end of the Cold War.
One of the first intellectuals who got a glimpse of what was going 
in the late 1980s was Francis Fukuyama. In his essay The End of History? 
published in summer of 1989 he wrote:
The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total 
exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism. In the past 
decade, there have been unmistakable changes in the intellectual climate of the 
world’s two largest communist countries, and the beginnings of significant 
reform movements in both. But this phenomenon extends beyond high politics 
and it can be seen also in the ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture 
in such diverse contexts as the peasants’ markets and color television sets now 
omnipresent throughout China, the cooperative restaurants and clothing stores 
opened in the past year in Moscow, the Beethoven piped into Japanese depart-
ment stores, and the rock music enjoyed alike in Prague, Rangoon, and Tehran4.
This passage misinterprets the nature of the conflict and the change 
that was taking place. It was not a triumph of the West over some Other 
(or others), but a triumph of one set of Western ideas (free market, 
parliamentary democracy and private ownership of means of produc-
tion), over another set of equally Western ideas (a dictatorship of 
a vanguard party, bureaucracy and central planning of a state-owned 
economy). Fukuyama was also deeply wrong when he prophesied the 
end of history as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. Whoever 
doubted it stopped doing so after the infamous 9/11. However, what 
he rightly grasped was a major shift in a global ideological paradigm. 
Whoever supported the basic slogan of neoliberalism – “There Is No 
Alternative” – before 1989 had at least an intellectual obligation to 
explain why anyone should have believed it. After 1989 “There Is No 
4 F. Fukuyama, The End of History?, “The National Interest”, Summer 1989.
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Alternative” became a sort of common sense, a doxa, and it was an 
obligation of its opponents to show why anyone should have doubted 
it. However, what’s crucial here for the genealogy of neoliberalism – not 
so much as an economic order, but as a powerful ideology – is that this 
shift was not mainly a result of a real, economic change, but rather 
stemmed from sentiments and emotions with which this change was 
greeted in the vanquished Soviet Bloc. “How great that we lost and 
how great that you won!” seemed to scream its citizens, by naming the 
squares in the working class neighborhoods after Ronald Reagan, and 
making McDonald’s restaurant in Moscow the busiest one in the world. 
It was precisely this Vae victis pronounced by the vanquished ones 
that allowed Fukuyama to finally declare the end of history without 
the question mark, paving the way for T.I.N.A. to become the neoli-
beral doxa of the 1990s. 
The thinker who articulated about the same time as Fukuyama, 
a much more critical diagnosis of the events of 1989 and 1990, was 
a French philosopher Alain Badiou. In 1991 he published a short book 
called D’un désastre obscure and devoted to the collapse of the so called 
communism in the Soviet Bloc. In his eyes “the political crisis that this 
collapse bears witness to is a crisis in the West just as much as in the 
East”5. According to Badiou, the triumph of capitalism should not be 
interpreted as a victory of freedom and emancipation. Rather the 
contrary:
It is precisely here where the obscurity and the difficulty of the moment resides: 
the fact that the that the Stalinist mode of politics was saturated and moribund 
– these are all excellent things […]. But instead of opening the path to an even-
tuality from which the deployment of another mode of politics would proceed, 
another singular figure of emancipation […], this collapse occurs under the 
aegis of the “democracy” of imperial owners. That the supreme political adviser 
of the situation is Bush; that the desire flaunted is that of inequality and owner-
ship, that the measure of all things is the IMF, that “thought” is only the vain 
reassessment of the most basic and most convenient opinions. If this were really 
to be the course of things, what melancholy6.
This “melancholy” is just another name for the neoliberal tyranny of 
T.I.N.A. 
5 A. Badiou, Of an Obscure Disaster: on the End of State-Truth, Maastricht 
2009, p. 6.




What links Fukuyama and Badiou is that both locate the decisive 
turning point in the formation of the contemporary global order in the 
very same moment in time: the rupture of the year 1989. What I’d like 
to attempt in this essay would be to describe and analyze the conditions 
of possibility of this rupture. I’ll do so, taking as an example the case 
of Poland. This choice is justified by two important reasons: Firstly, the 
decisive sign of the final collapse of the Soviet Bloc was not so much 
the fall of the Berlin Wall – although it was the most spectacular and 
the most symbolic one – but partially free parliamentary elections that 
took place in Poland on June the 4th 1989, more than a year before the 
events in Berlin. Secondly, due to a massive social (and, as I’ll try to 
prove, not at all pro-market or pro-capitalist) movement of Solidarity 
in the 1980s, the case of Poland presents the most ironic example of the 
triumph of neoliberalism. The paradoxical fate of Polish workers – who 
vanquished the Party rule just to be vanquished by capitalism that they 
helped themselves to introduce to the country, yet were still hailing the 
blessings of free market – epitomizes the crucial ideological victory that 
enabled neoliberalism to present itself in the 1990s as the only possible 
option for the entire humanity. This clearly shows that we need some 
kind of “a third way” of analyzing neoliberalism, as Wacquant7 advoca-
tes. Structural approach and governmentality studies seem to be com-
plementary, rather than contradictory, paradigms of analyzing neolibe-
ral hegemony as the latter uses both ways – macrostructural capturing 
of the state machine and ideological micro-management aiming at new 
modes of subjectivity8 – to impose its rule. It seems that the focus on 
the issue of governmentality alone as the central force of neoliberalism 
is a byproduct of trust put in its own ideology, namely its claim (even 
if not advocated by the entire neoliberal theory, ubiquitous in the public 
discourse of neoliberal politicians) that the state and the market are 
necessarily opposing each other and we have to weaken the state to 
enforce the market. What Wacquant shows in a very persuasive way is 
that neoliberal capitalism needs the state as a condition sine qua non of 
its existence. However, there is nothing new about the neoliberal capi-
talism in this respect. Giovanni Arrighi9 demonstrates in his formidable 
7 L. Wacquant, Three Steps to a Historical Anthropology of Actually Existing 
Neoliberalism, “Social Anthropology” 2012, No. 20, p. 66-79.
8 M. Foucault, L’´ethique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté’, [in:] 
Dits et écrits, t. 2, Paris 2001.
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book, The Long Twentieth Century, that the state and the market have 
existed in a perfect symbiosis from the very beginning of capitalist accu-
mulation, and one could not imagine any form of capitalist economy 
without an active support of the state.
I’ll attempt to trace the conditions of possibility of neoliberal victory 
of 1989 in three consecutive steps. First I’ll identify the reasons for the 
crisis and failure of what Badiou calls “the State-Truth” – the mode of 
social, political and economic organization that seemed to be an alter-
native to the liberal capitalism for decades. Second, I’ll sketch a short 
description of Solidarity as an example of an opposition movement within 
the Soviet Bloc, with a special emphasis on its attitude towards capitalism. 
Third, I’ll focus on the transition from central planning to free market 
that took place in the late 1980s and 1900s, analyzing the role played 
in it by both the opposition and the Communist Party elites. This will 
show that Wacquant10 is right by assuming that neoliberals capture rather 
than dismantle the state machine. Although Poland was a relatively poor 
country in the 1980s, its transformation follows the welfare-to-workfare 
mode postulated by Wacquant, rather than the African mode described 
by Hilgers11. I’ll sum up my analysis by drawing some general conclusions 
from the diagnosed modus operandi of the neoliberal ideology.
Of the so called communism
The reader may have already noticed that each time I use the term 
“communism” I put it in quotation marks or I add the expression “so 
called”. I believe there are strong theoretical and historical reasons to 
question the communist nature of regimes developed within the Soviet 
Bloc in the 20th century. Of course, this is the case if we accept the 
conceptual framework developed by Marx and Engels12 as a point of 
10 L. Wacquant, Three steps...
11 M. Hilgers, The Historicity of the Neoliberal State, “Social Anthropology” 2012, 
No. 20. Of course, it does not invalidate Hilgers’ assumptions made in the African 
context. However, it shows that Poland – and the same remains true for most of 
Central and Eastern Europe – might have resembled African countries in the late 
1980-ties as far as GDP and other macro-economic factors are considered, however 
its political and social landscape was very different and this difference had a decisive 
impact on its trajectory towards neoliberal order.
12 K. Marx, F. Engel, The Communist Manifesto: a Modern Edition with an 
Introduction by Eric Hobsbawm, London 1998; idem, The German Ideology including 




reference. If we adopt a pragmatic-realist approach and say that “com-
munism” is whatever people call this way, then there can be no more 
discussion. However, this point of view generates some serious problems. 
The regimes within the Soviet Bloc also called themselves “free” and 
“democratic” (like the German Democratic Republic). To be consistent 
in our pragmatic realism we would also have to agree that “freedom” 
and “democracy” is what was practiced in the Soviet Bloc. This assump-
tion blurs any distinction between democracy and dictatorship into 
nothingness: if what existed in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
most countries of Central-Eastern Europe in the second half of 20th 
century was freedom and democracy, then anything can be called this 
way, and these terms lose any meaning whatsoever. We must have some 
external standard beyond any actual social practice to judge the level of 
democracy and freedom of a given political regime. I believe the same 
applies to communism.
It’s a surprisingly easy exercise to compare the socio-political reality 
of the Soviet Bloc with the standard provided by Marx and Engels, even 
despite the fact that the vision of communist order is not presented in 
details in their writings. The contrast is so obvious that even a vogue 
(vague?) idea of communism is good enough to serve as a point of 
reference. Was there anything like social ownership of means of produc-
tion in the Soviet Bloc? No, there was a state ownership and this is 
a completely different thing. Were social classes abolished? No, they 
weren’t, and comparisons were made by economists to show that the 
level of social inequalities within the Soviet Bloc (expressed by GINI 
coefficient) was virtually equal to more egalitarian capitalist societies 
like those in Scandinavia13. Was there a dictatorship of proletariat? No, 
there was a dictatorship of a vanguard party, and only according to Lenin 
and the Bolsheviks it should be regarded as a mediated rule of the people. 
Many other communists never accepted their ideas. We can also easily 
show various constitutive elements of the Soviet order that cannot be 
found in the Marxist vision of the communist utopia: strong nationalism, 
secret police and political prisons, to name just the most obvious ones14.
13 Nierówni i równiejsi: sprawiedliwość dystrybucyjna czasu transformacji 
w Polsce, ed. T. Kowalik, Warsaw 2002.
14 Some may argue that the Section II of the Communist Manifesto contains 
statements and guidelines that look like a masterplan of really existing communism 
in the Soviet Bloc; these are the features that Collier (S. Collier, Neoliberalism as Big 
Leviathan, or …?: a Response to Wacquant and Hilgers, “Social Anthropology” 2012, 
No. 21, p. 188) refers to in his discussion with Wacquant and Hilgers. However one 
has to remember that in the preface to the second German edition of the Manifesto, 
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Of course, the question “how communist was communism?” has 
been raised and answered many times. There have been three most nota-
ble attempts to sort out this issue. First, Trockyist heretics, like Tony Cliff 
– calling soviet communism “state capitalism” and showing that as a result 
of the “Stalinist perversion” the State-Party machine became the sole 
owner of means of production – i.e. the sole capitalist – and it had acted 
accordingly ever since. Cliff’s State Capitalism in Russia15 elaborates quite 
well upon this thesis. The second approach to the Soviet question is the 
one adopted by Guy Debord, who believed that the Leninist “proletarian 
parties” turned themselves into a bureaucratic ruling class, governing 
over a form of spectacle called “concentrated spectacularity”. Debord 
prophesied its merge with a diffuse spectacle of capitalist states and cre-
ation of a “unified spectacle”16. Neoliberal globalization of 1990s fits 
quite well in this vision. The third attempt was undertaken by Immanuel 
Wallerstein17. According to him, Soviet Bloc countries never had a chance 
to establish a “communist mode of production”. In his perspective, only 
world-systems can have modes of production, not individual states, or 
even blocs of states. In a framework of World-System Theory, Soviet Bloc 
was an integral, semi-peripheral part of global capitalism. Its place in 
global division of labor was determined not by itself, but by the Core 
states. “Communist” countries were therefore never able to break away 
(even if their political elites intended to, which had not been always the 
written in 1872, the authors themselves call these guidelines into question as they 
write: “The practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself 
states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being 
existing, and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measu-
res proposed at the end of Section II. That passage would, in many respects, be 
very differently worded today. In view of the gigantic strides of Modern Industry 
since 1848, and of the accompanying improved and extended organization of the 
working class, in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February 
Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for 
the first time held political power for two whole months, this programme has in 
some details been antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, 
viz., that »the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machi-
nery, and wield it for its own purposes«”. It looks like Lenin and the Bolsheviks 
must have missed this very important remark that invalidates the very sense of their 
whole experiment.
15 T. Cliff, State Capitalism in Russia, London 1974.
16 G. Debord, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, London 1998.
17 I. Wallerstein, The Rise and Future Demise of World Capitalist Systems: 
Concepts for Future Analysis, “Comparative Studies in Society and History” 1974, 
Vol. XVI, No. 4; idem, Societal Development or Development of the World-System?, 




case) from the capitalist logic of infinite accumulation, nor from struc-
tures of economic rationality attached to it. In this perspective the “com-
munist experiment” was an example of mercantilist economic policy 
aimed at stimulating development in a backward region of a global capi-
talist world-system. Of course, one could argue that the Soviet regime 
was on its way to becoming a communist one. This is, however, impos-
sible to verify, and – what’s even a bigger theoretical problem here – 
according to the orthodox historical materialism, even a primitive society 
based on slave labor is on its way towards communism. It’s just still very 
far from it.
It would require a separate paper to fully investigate the nature of 
Soviet regime. I believe that the most accurate term to describe them 
would be “Leninist states” as they conformed mostly to the vision elabo-
rated by Lenin between 1917 and 1924. This vision had two crucial 
elements: rule of a vanguard party exercised theoretically in the name 
of the proletariat, and state ownership of means of production. Its goal 
was to perform an intensive and rapid modernization of rural societies 
through heavy industrialization, and then to jump quickly into commu-
nism18. Marx did not envision this kind of development as the most 
desired one and believed that communism should come to existence in 
a highly developed capitalist society like England or Germany. Of course, 
the ideas of Lenin where later distorted by Stalin, but he did not add any 
important elements to the original model. He rather radicalized some of 
them – like the role of the vanguard party – and used them for new 
purposes.
The most important thing for the development of global hegemony 
of neoliberalism was not so much the nature of Soviet states, but the 
reasons of their decline. The supremacy of liberal capitalism had been 
less than obvious, at least until late 1960s and early 1970s. When Khru-
shchev told Nixon during the so called “Kitchen Debate” at the World 
Fair in Moscow in 1959 that Soviet Union would “overtake America 
and then wave »Bye, bye!«„ it was greeted with laughter by a crowd of 
bystanders, but not treated solely as a joke by the US vice president. The 
US had reasons to believe that the Soviet system was competitive and 
efficient. It was only under the rule of Brezhnev that USSR and the 
entire Soviet Bloc went into a rapid decline. 
So, what were the immanent causes of this decline that paved the 
way for the “end of history”? It’s a very Derridian situation, because the 
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cure – pharmakon – for social misery that was injected in the foundations 
of Leninist states turn out to be the poison that brought it down19. It 
was the vision of modernization through massive, heavy industrialization. 
Apart from the role it played in the system of Leninism – a quick jump 
from agrarian economy to communism was possible thanks to the rapid 
production of both wealth and industrial proletariat by heavy industry 
– this policy was cherished for a long time by the Soviet elites, because 
it proved to be quite handy in the game of international competition. 
Soviet Bloc could prove how good its system was by pointing to its 
output of steel, coal, copper, cement, railroads and other products typi-
cal for heavy industry. Had it gone in a completely different way – let’s 
say, towards sustainable and efficient solutions for the poor proposed 
by Ivan Illich in Energy and Equity20 – this whole game would not have 
been possible. And most likely the fate of the Soviet Bloc would have 
been different. 
The Leninist mode of development created over time a deadlock 
impossible to solve within its own logic. The stress put on heavy indu-
strialization caused a chronic and systemic overinvestment in the pro-
duction of means of production (heavy industrial plants, machines, 
coal to power them, steel to make more machines, railroads to transport 
coal and steel etc.) and underinvestment in the production means of 
consumption (merchandise for people to buy). This situation is illu-
strated by some statistics in Table 1.
Type of production 1972 1984 1987
Production of means of 
production for the production 
of means of production
54,1% 50,8% 53,5%
Production of means of 
production for the production 
of means of consumption 
18,0% 19,0% 18,1%




Table 1. The structure of industrial production in Poland between 1972 and 198721.
19 J. Derrida, Dissemination, Chicago 1981.
20 I. Illich, Energy and Equity, London 1974.




Apart from supply shortages and social unrest it provoked, such 
a situation resulted in a constant inflation. It’s a logical consequence: 
the economies of Soviet Bloc states did produce wealth – in a sense of 
industrial output – so they produced money; however it was difficult 
to spend this money on anything useful for an average citizen, because 
the system produced mainly more means of production. Absence of 
merchandise and presence of money pushed the prices up. Economic 
weakness provoked devaluation of currency, and it was more and more 
expensive to cover the shortages by imports. Imports meant trade defi-
cit and growing debt. Due to the stress put on industrial development, 
mismanagement caused massive losses, because resources invested in 
the production of means of production – like a construction of a new 
plant – remained frozen as long as the plant did not start to produce. 
And it could not produce even if a small element – like a crucial part 
for machines – was missing. With growing chaos and declining moti-
vation of managers whose wages were getting smaller and smaller because 
of inflation, it was taking longer and longer to get any returns form the 
investments made.
In such a situation, the Soviet Bloc states more than welcomed the 
possibility to borrow cheaply on international markets of late 1970s. 
And they all borrowed lots of money. The foreign debt of Poland grew 
during the “communist” time to 49,3 billions of dollars, Russia – 59,3 
billions, Bulgaria – 10,3 billion and Hungary – 21,2 billions, to give 
just a few examples22. In the 1980s, the price of debt went up, and it 
delivered a final blow to the economies of the Soviet Bloc.
The very collapse of the Soviet Bloc is important for understanding 
the genealogy of the current neoliberal hegemony for several reasons. The 
fact that “communist” economies went literally bankrupt allowed liberal 
forces to appropriate a symbolic credit for their fall. Centrally planned 
economies failed – the story goes – because they could not withstand the 
challenge of competing with the liberal ones. There shouldn’t be any 
doubts that many external conditions and processes had an influence on 
what happened to the Soviet Bloc, however there is no evidence to support 
the claim that it was Ronald Reagan, the US and liberal capitalism that 
destroyed the Soviet Empire and brought freedom to Central and Eastern 
Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Bloc happened due to the inherent 
flaws in its economic and social design. Although it was quite handy for 
Ronald Reagan, “Chicago boys” and other apologists of free market to 
22 G. Górniewicz, Zadłużenie zagraniczne jako problem globalny, [in:] Problemy 
globalizacji gospodarki, ed. T. Bernat, Szczecin 2003.
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declare their victory over centrally planned economy, international mar-
ket forces had a considerable impact only in the final phase of the 
decline. The neoliberals and neoconservatives – by the way, Rousseau 
would have a real intellectual delight seeing how liberal and conservative 
extremes meet in the “neo-” phase of these ideologies – made a great 
PR gain by overstating the role played by the global capitalism in this 
collapse. They acted like a wise king from Saint-Exupéry’s Little Prince, 
who orders the sun to go down just before the sunset. (And every pro-
paganda specialist knows that appearances are as good as the real thing 
as long as the majority thinks they are real.) And they were not the only 
ones to play this game. Many other individuals and organizations tried 
to take credit for beating USSR. The Catholic Church, Lech Walesa, 
Solidarity and even Osama bin Laden did the same. Osama mentioned 
the issue openly in 1997, saying: “After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
in which the US has no mentionable role, but rather the credit goes to 
God, Praise and Glory be to Him, and the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, 
this collapse made the US more haughty and arrogant and it has started 
to look at itself as a Master of this world and established what it calls 
the new world order”23.
The degeneration of centrally planned state economies, and hardship 
it brought on the citizens of Leninist states, created two very important 
conditions of possibility of neoliberal hegemony. First, it meant a loss of 
face for any idea of collective ownership of means of production. Or 
even any moderate alternative to private ownership. It’s very easy for neo-
liberal propaganda to present any critique of liberal capitalism as an attempt 
to go back to the “communist” Soviet past that proved to be so inefficient. 
The second issue crucial for neoliberal victory in the early 1990s was 
a glorification of consumer culture that took place in the declining 
Leninist states, where it was seen as a paradise on Earth. The picture of 
thousands of people gathering in front of McDonald’s in Moscow shows 
just the reverse side of what Hungarian economist János Kornai called 
“economics of shortage”24. Empty shop shelves, that remained an iconic 
representation of the miserable 1980s for most citizens of the Soviet Bloc, 
created a sort of psychic condition for channeling all the libidinal energy 
into building liberal capitalism in the 1990s.
23 P. Arnett, Transcript of Osama Bin Ladin Interview Aired by CNN in March 
1997, http://www.anusha.com/osamaint.htm.




Empty shelves in a Polish shop in 1980s
This fact was recently used by the International Advertising Association 
in a pro-ad campaign. When Polish authorities attempted to limit pre-
sence of outdoor advertising in public space, IAA launched a campaign 
with a picture of an empty shop from 1980s and a slogan “No advertising? 
We have already known that!”. What’s even more ironic, the campaign 
was presented as a voice “in defense of freedom of speech and commer-
cial utterance”, whatever “commercial utterance” could mean.
Poster from the pro-ad campaign of IAA 
in Poland in 2006.
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The defeat of Solidarity
However exaggerated and even megalomaniac is the conviction that 
Solidarity destroyed USSR, it would be unjust to deny this movement 
any credit for social and political transformation of the Soviet Bloc. 
Leninist states would have fallen on their own, even if Solidarity wasn’t 
there, but without Solidarity and its legacy, the 1990s would have looked 
different in Central and Eastern Europe, and may have been similar to 
what happened in the Balkans.
Solidarity was an exceptional social and political phenomenon by 
any standard. It reached 10 million of members, constituting ¼ of the 
entire population of Poland during its short existence between August 
1980 and December 1981, which makes it one of the largest formalized 
organizations in European history. NSDAP had, for example, only 8,5 
millions of members at its peak. Among its contemporaries, Solidarity 
could easily rival the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that had 11 
million members, whereas Poland’s population wasn’t even half that of 
the Soviet Union. Of course, we are still far from the Communist Party 
of China, claiming 72 million members, however this number does not 
amount to even 10% of the Chinese population.
Solidarity originated as a trade union and formally it has remained one 
until today, though from the beginning of 1990s it has practically func-
tioned as a political party. It developed gradually, building upon several 
confrontations between workers and the Party: in 1956 in Poznan, in 1970 
in Gdansk and in 1976 in Ursus near Warsaw, to mention just the most 
important ones. This fact was stressed in official declarations of the Union 
(like the Solidarity’s Program formulated in October 1981) as well as by 
commentators and analysts. American historian Lawrence Goodwyn shows 
in his book, Breaking the Barrier. The Rise of Solidarity in Poland25, how 
workers developed and perfected their organizational skills throughout 
three decades of protests (in summer 1980, the Interfactory Strike Com-
mittee unified 522 industrial plants in Northern Poland in a very well 
designed network of communication and coordinated action).
During just a year after its legal registration in 1980, Solidarity lost 
its purely working class and industrial identity, becoming a movement 
of the proletariat in Marxist sense – the exploited and deprived of control 
and ownership of means of production. Its base could not have been 
narrowed down any further to any social category. Solidarity united 





people of almost every possible social identity: industrial workers, intel-
lectuals, teachers, students, taxi drivers, miners, writers, journalists, etc. 
It was organized in an ultra-democratic, participatory manner in order 
to give each and every member the biggest possible control over Union’s 
policies and actions. Big stress was put on internal and external transpa-
rency: for example during negotiations with the government at the time 
of the strikes in the Gdansk Shipyard in August 1980, all talks between 
workers and government representatives where broadcast in the entire 
plant through intercoms. It’s an interesting fact that one of the first 
suggestions made by oppositional intellectuals when they joined the 
workers in the Shipyard, was that to take part in the talks was to make 
them secret. This idea was put forward by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, future 
politician and first prime minister of post-communist government, who 
introduced neoliberal reforms in Poland in 1989 and 199026.
There is a myth of pro-capitalist and pro-liberal character of Solidarity. 
However, even a brief look at the official Program of Solidarity formula-
ted in October 198127 falsifies this claim. In this 60-pages-long document, 
one doesn’t find even a single appearance of the word “capitalism”. And 
it was not just a smart rhetoric maneuver designed to fool the censors. 
There is no other word or term, where “capitalism” appears in disguise. 
There are few mentions of “market” (but never accompanied by the adjec-
tive “free”), however in each and every place the market is described as 
a supplementary measure intended to work within the frame of a desa-
linated and socially controlled economy. The same applies to another holy 
cow of neoliberal capitalist rhetoric: private property and privatization. 
The word “private” (or its derivative) appears only four times in the docu-
ment and only two of them actually refer to private companies. There is 
absolutely no mention of any sort of privatization of state and public 
property. Actually, the program demands the contrary in an explicit and 
consistent manner. The term used more often than any other – I counted 
144 uses – is “social” in all possible forms and combinations: social justice, 
social welfare, social protests, social movement, social rebirth, social ini-
tiative, social costs of economic reforms and the most important ones, 
because referring to the question of political economy: social enterprise, 
social control over economy and a demand communist par excellence 
– social ownership of means of production. This point is of utmost 
importance. Solidarity goes even further in a very symptomatic way: it 
26 Ibidem.
27 Program NSZZ „Solidarność” uchwalony przez Zjazd Delegatów dnia 7 
października 1981 r. w Gdańsku, „Tygodnik Solidarność”, No. 29, 16.10.1981.
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addresses the communist Party with a demand of “real socialization of 
control over economy”. It’s a very Lacanian moment, when the Party gets 
its own message in a reversed form28.
The passage from this not at all pro-capitalist attitude of early 1980s 
to the most vicious neoliberalism of the early 1990s happened in two 
stages. The Martial Law introduced in Poland in 1981 was the first one. 
It crashed Solidarity in a very literal sense of the word. With tanks on 
streets and opposition leaders in prisons, Solidarity lost its momentum 
and never fully recovered from the blow delivered by the military fist. 
In this sense the Martial Law served its purpose. I would say even more, 
and claim that Poland was on a way towards a revolution in the early 
1980s that – if fulfilled – would dramatically reshape power relations 
and ideological landscape in Europe. It’s too much to say that it would 
abolish the global rule of capital, but it would not allow neoliberalism 
to triumph so ruthlessly in the 1990s and Francis Fukuyama to proclaim 
the end of history. It would keep an alternative alive. The Party was well 
aware of Solidarity’s strength, especially after the events of March 1981, 
when the union called its 10 million members to make a general strike 
and put the entire country – and I mean “entire” in its literal sense: 
every single company and enterprise – to a stop. Introducing the 
Martial Law was the only logical thing to do. Crashing the popular 
movement of Solidarity ironically also served the interests of capitalism, 
because it eliminated a strong and viable alternative. In this sense Gene-
ral Jaruzelski paved the way for neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. It also 
shows that Wacqaunt29 is correct when he points to the usefulness and 
importance of state machine for the neoliberal transformation. One of 
its function is not only to suppress dissent, but to actively eliminate 
alternatives that could undermine the capitalist order.
The second step on a road from social revolution to liberal privatiza-
tion was made in late 1980s. Solidarity reappeared after the Martial Law, 
but it was changed. It was more and more influenced by intellectuals 
and other social elites. Liberal ideas were not popular among the workers, 
but had a considerable support among intellectuals, especially in Krakow 
(again: one can see how the Stalinist attempt to crash the bourgeois 
character of this city had completely failed). It was from there that 
a group of oppositionists started propagating ideas of Milton Friedman 
28 J. Majmurek, K. Mikurda, J. Sowa, Un événement dans la glacière: le 
Carnaval de Solidarnosc (1980-81) comme jaillissement de l’imagination politique, 
[in:] A. Badiou, S. Žižek, L’Idée du communisme, t. 2, Paris 2011.




and Friedrich von Hayek. Their leader, a philosopher Mirosław Dzielski 
died before the collapse of USSR, but others – like Tadeusz Syryjczyk or 
Ryszard Legutko – became members of cabinet and/or parliament.
Another important liberal center formed in Gdańsk in northern 
Poland in mid-1980s. Their most notable figures were Donald Tusk 
(current Prime Minister of Poland), Janusz Lewandowski (minister 
responsible for privatization in early 1990s, currently member of the 
European Parliament) and Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Prime Minister in 
1991, high ranking official in European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development between 1993 and 2003).The activity of these figures, 
however important, is not solely responsible for the final triumph of 
neoliberalism in Poland. What opened the way to this victory was 
a change within the Communist Party itself. Only coupling of this two 
parallel process – consolidation of right-wing neoliberal opposition in 
the second half of 1980s and a liberal turn within the Party – delivered 
a final blow to the vision of a more just and egalitarian passage out of 
the Leninist state.
Of the so called communists
Looking back at the history of the Soviet Bloc one may wonder, how 
such a horrible system could have had a support of a considerable part 
of the population. Despite the way it is often presented by the Polish 
right wingers, popular attitudes toward the social, political and econo-
mic ideas of the Bolsheviks were far from unanimously critical. That 
was especially true in the years following the World War II. Although 
the II Republic of Poland that came to existence in 1918 and was 
conquered by Hitler and Stalin in 1939 is currently idealized and con-
sidered to be an ideal state, its contemporary was much more critical. 
With its anti-Semitism, nationalism, backwardness, clericalism and 
antidemocratic coup undertaken by Piłsudski in 1926 the II Republic 
had quite a lot of opponents. The effort of industrialization carried out 
by new authorities after the war was regarded as an attempt to break 
away from a condition of peripheral agrarian state that Poland had been 
stuck in since the 16th century30. And it did profoundly reshape social 
30 P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, London 1979; F. Braudel, Civi-
lisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe siècle, t. 2: Les jeux de l’échange, 
Paris 1979; I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System I. Capitalist Agriculture and the 
Origins of the European World-Economy in the 16th Century, New York 1974.
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reality, bringing electricity, roads, schools, industry and social emanci-
pation to some of the most backward parts of Europe.
The situation dramatically changed after the 20th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev 
denounced the crimes of Joseph Stalin. Although his famous speech, On 
the Personality Cult and its Consequences, was delivered during a secret 
session, its transcripts and translations penetrated the Soviet Bloc imme-
diately. Its cyclostyle copies were sold at countryside bazaars and city 
markets throughout Poland. Khrushchev aimed mainly at Stalin that he 
personally hated him for various humiliations he experienced during 
Stalin’s rule. His ideological intention was to bring Soviet Union closer 
to the original vision of Lenin that Stalin had deeply distorted31. Howe-
ver, his anti-Stalinist discourse strongly undermined the entire edifice of 
Leninist states. In order to support the Soviet rule before 1956, one could 
have been just a naïve idealist. After 1956 it required a certain doze (dose?) 
of cynicism and a strong conviction that goals justify means. This ideolo-
gical shake-up provoked waves of social unrest in the entire Bloc. Its best 
known symbolic representation is the attack on Stalin’s figure in Budapest 
in 1956. Lawrence Goodwyn shows in his formidable book on Solidarity, 
how the massive workers’ protest in Poznan the same year gave birth to 
the organized opposition movement in Poland32.
Hungarians gather around the head of the toppled Stalin Monument in Budapest 
in autumn of 1956
31 W. Taubman, Khrushchev: the Man and His Era, London 2004.




The year 1956 was a definite breaking point and marked the begin-
ning of a moral slope down of the entire Soviet project. Retrospectively, 
this moment can be regarded as the end of the Soviet communism as 
a noble and morally superior alternative to capitalism. Subsequent events 
such as Prague 1968, publication of Solzhenitsyn’s, The Gulag Archipe-
lago, in 1973, or the Martial Law in Poland in 1981, were just a sequel 
to the deeply disturbing revelation made by Khrushchev. So the year 
1956 is the beginning of the end of history – an event in the strong, 
philosophical sense advocated by Badiou33 that created a possibility of 
new possibility. It was a possibility of overcoming the Soviet regime – 
something that seemed unimaginable during Stalin years. People around 
the Soviet Bloc realized it perfectly well, and were taking their protests 
to the streets regularly until the system’s collapse in 1989. But it was 
also a possibility of a completely different arrangement on a global scale. 
This possibility was enacted 35 years later as the neoliberal T.I.N.A.
Soviet regime started losing legitimacy, but it still had power. For 
this reason it was not so difficult for it to get supporters and staff to fill 
posts in the power apparatus. However, starting from 1956, an active 
engagement in the system was motivated less and less by idealism and 
more and more by pragmatic cynicism. People were still joining ruling 
parties around the Bloc, though it wasn’t an expression of ideals anymore, 
but rather a way to get a better job, an apartment, a coupon for a car 
(centrally planned economy gave the authorities a possibility to manage 
access to consumption and to use it as another mean of exercising power). 
As long as the economies of the Soviet Bloc remained functional, this 
arrangement worked. There was an option of a career within the system, 
so it kept at least some individuals – and importantly the most active 
ones – out of looking for alternatives.
The 1980s mark a definite change in the situation. Economic slump 
at the beginning of this decade, violent protest that followed it, an 
extremely expensive (both financially and symbolically) failure of the 
Russians in Afghanistan – it all persuaded not only the opposition, but 
even the government officials, that “a time for a regime change” had 
come. And it was this ideological evolution within the Parties themselves 
that supplied the final condition for the neoliberal transformation of 
the Soviet Bloc in the early 1990s. 
This change of attitudes was reflected by a radical shift towards the 
liberal model of economy taking place in Poland still under the Party 
rule in the second part of 1980s. It was called “economic reform” and 
33 A. Badiou, Being and Event, London 2005.
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“marketization” and the Party tried to present it as a lift-up of the socia-
list system (at this stage even the “communist” regimes did not call 
themselves communist anymore). The slogan to support the change was 
“Socialism – Yes! Mistakes – No!”. But as a matter of fact it had nothing 
to do with any socialist ideas. What is often omitted or overlooked in 
the history of Polish transformation, is the fact that first economic chan-
ges putting the country on the path of capitalist development were made 
at the end of Soviet times, between 1986 and 198934. They included 
liberating prices, abandoning central control over economy, creating 
a legal system for private enterprise, changing bank regulation to create 
financial market, reforming the tax law and dozens of other small legal 
changes. Ironically, it was the Marxist Party that introduced Poland to 
the International Monetary Fund in the late 1980s. Without this struc-
tural change of state mechanisms and their legal expressions initiated by 
the state and carried out with a help of its repressive apparatus, no sys-
temic change would have been possible; that indirectly proves one of the 
main Wacquant’s35 thesis about the use that neoliberals do of the state 
machine. It’s important to underline that the socialist state did not just 
pull back, allowing the society to spontaneously develop towards 
a market economy. The state rather actively created the market economy 
out of the crumbling remains of centrally planned social economy.
Party members, even high ranking officials, were becoming private 
entrepreneurs, mainly by taking control over restructured states enter-
prises. Jadwiga Staniszkis showed that 80% of Party elite from the 1980s 
became private entrepreneurs in the 1990s36. This crucial process has 
to be matched against the changes taking place within the opposition. 
As mentioned above, the so-called Second Solidarity of late 1980s, as 
opposed to the First of 1980-1981, had a strong liberal wing. The pro-
-market and pro-capitalist shift within the Party created an obvious 
common ground for them to meet and thus enforced pro-capitalist 
elements within the Opposition. Seeing that the apparatchiks were 
becoming capitalist entrepreneurs, the oppositionists did not want to 
lag behind. At the same time – and this is absolutely crucial for expla-
ining the final embrace of neoliberal agenda within the former Soviet 
Bloc – there were no more socialist or communist idealists within 
34 J. Urbański, The Anatomy of the Polish Workers’ Protests, [in:] Over and 
Over Again: 1989-2009, ed. J. Sowa, A. Szyłak, Cracow 2009.
35 L. Wacquant, Three steps...
36 J. Staniszkis, Post-Communism: the Emerging Enigma, “Europe-Asia Studies” 




the Party itself. As a result, only the right wing of the opposition could 
find a partner on the side of the establishment. Those who still believed 
in the original social program of Solidarity remained isolated and were 
labeled “extremists”, “utopists”, “crypto-communist” or “anarcho-syn-
dicalists” by their peers. It should not be surprising why “the new demo-
cratic governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have expli-
citly rejected the idea of experimenting with a »third way« between 
capitalism and state socialism, aiming instead to replicate the economic 
institutions of Western Europe”37.
The change within the Party did not happen without an intervention 
from the outside. Western countries, especially the United States, put 
a considerable effort in picking the most active individuals from the 
elites of Soviet Bloc and “educating” them in neoliberal doxa. It happe-
ned through various kinds of grants, scholarships and internships pro-
grams. During the Soviet times it was a way easier to get a scholarship 
in a Western country if one was a Party member, rather than an oppo-
sition activist. It was not only due to the fact that the Party made it 
easier for their members to leave, but also because western institutions 
providing funds for the exchange – Fulbright Program can serve as the 
best example – were much keener on bringing the Party members in 
order to convert them to capitalism rather than oppositionists who were 
regarded as already converted.
A good example of a Party apparatchik becoming leading neoliberal 
is Leszek Balcerowicz, the Minister of Finance in the first after-1989 
government of Poland. Balcerowicz became a party member in 1969, 
just a year after an anti-Semite cleansing in the Party made such intel-
lectuals as Zygmunt Bauman or Leszek Kołakowski leave the country. 
He became closely associated with the government. In late 1970s and 
early 1980s he worked in Institute for Basic Problems of Marxism-
-Leninism and was Prime Minister’s chief economic adviser. He spent 
quite a lot of time abroad in the same period. He received an MBA from 
Saint John’s University in New York and sojourned in University of 
Sussex and University of Marburg. 
Balcerowicz is hailed for designing the so called “Balcerowicz Plan” 
– a neoliberal “shock therapy”38 that introduced free market economy in 
Poland. As a matter of fact, it would be difficult to find any element of 
37 J. Sachs, D. Lipton, Poland’s Economic Reform, “Foreign Affairs” Summer 
1990.
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original intellectual contribution made by Balcerowicz to this plan. Its 
genealogy is rather a part of global neoliberal shift of the 1980s and 
1990s. In the summer of 1989, Balcerowicz met with two foreign eco-
nomic advisers, who traveled to Poland on an invitation from Polish 
Government and sponsored by the Soros Foundation: Jeffrey Sachs and 
David Lipton. Sachs brought with him a packet of reforms resembling 
to what is known today as the Washington Consensus39. Balcerowicz was 
familiar with them, thanks to his experience at western universities, and 
had similar ideas of how to “repair” Polish economy. Together with three 
other economist,s they created a detailed plan of “shock therapy” for the 
Polish economy that Lipton and Sachs presented to the public in autumn 
the same year, in an article written for a Polish financial journal “Gazeta 
Bankowa” as “a jump into a market economy”40. The plan was voted by 
the Polish parliament in December the same year, and enacted imme-
diately. Poland became the show-case of neoliberal transformation. Libe-
ral capitalism replaced its “last and only alternative” – centrally planned 
economy of Leninist states. The history came to an end.
Conclusions
Genealogy of neoliberalism as a set of ideas has little or even nothing 
to do with Central and Eastern Europe. The only thing one could 
mention in this context is the fact that Friedrich von Hayek was an 
Austrian, which is not particularly relevant to the matter at hand (altho-
ugh the novels of Thomas Bernhard and Peter Handke or films of 
Michael Haneke could lead to a different conclusion, but this is already 
a field of literary and art criticism where I do not intend to venture). 
However, genealogy of neoliberalism as a practice in the field of society 
and economy has a lot to do with the recent history of Central and 
Eastern Europe. It was the collapse of Leninist states and an uncritical 
embrace of neoliberal ideas in the former Soviet Bloc that allowed 
neoliberalism to achieve hegemony on a global level and led scholars 
such as Francis Fukuyama to declare its final victory over any other 
possible arrangements. In the Hegelian vision of history and society – 
39 L.C.B. Pereira, J.M. Maravall, A. Przeworski, Economic Reforms in New 
Democracies: a Social-Democratic Approach, Cambridge 1993.
40 J. Sachs, D. Lipton, Skok w gospodarkę rynkową, „Gazeta Bankowa” No. 36, 
4.09-10.09.1989. See also: J. Sachs, D. Lipton, Poland’s Economic Reform; 




adopted by Fukuyama, but also by a lot of important thinkers on the 
Left – a repetition is the first condition of universalization. From this 
perspective, the fate of former Leninist states that were treated with 
a “shock therapy” originally designed in Southern American context, 
is exactly such a repetition and has to be regarded as a turning point 
in the history of neoliberal practice. Had these countries gone in 
a different direction and retained the ideas originally hailed by Solida-
rity or developed – for instance – a viable example of “the third way”, 
no one could have claimed that There Is No Alternative. In this sense, 
the neoliberal transformation of the Soviet Bloc was for neoliberalism 
– as a practice and as ideology – what the Haitian Revolution of 1791-
1803 was for the ideas of the French Revolution41 – a repetition that 
paved the road towards universality.
The process of formation of neoliberal hegemony, and a place the 
Soviet Bloc had in it, provides us with a valuable lesson in the field of 
social influence and socio-political change. As I tried to show, neolibe-
ralism triumphed, because it found a way to reach both popular ima-
gination of the masses – through a cult of consumption and individual 
freedom regarded as an exact opposite of the “communist” poverty and 
oppression – and the elites via various scholarship, internship and scien-
tific exchange programs. The second element accounts for structural 
transformation as diagnosed by Wacquant42, however it was the com-
bination of both that secured neoliberals with the ultimate success as 
it allowed a peaceful and “democratic” transformation: the hungry mas-
ses mortified by the “economics of shortage” wanted McDonald’s restau-
rants more than anything else, so the transformation happened “with 
a popular support”; the elites were properly indoctrinated, so the revo-
lution turned out to be “velvet”. This situation reveals some universal 
truth about the nature of neoliberal hegemony. It’s a combination of 
shaping the elites and providing bait for the masses that makes neoli-
beralism such a powerful discourse. Anyone who decides to challenge 
it has to find a way to fight it on both levels. Or to abandon the distinc-
tion between the elites and the masses altogether. It’s hard to say which 
option is more difficult.
41 S. Buck-Morss, Hegel and Haiti, “Critical Inquiry” 2000, Vol. 26, No. 4.
42 L. Wacquant, Three steps...
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Tytuł: Niespodziewany zwrot ideologii. Neoliberalizm i upadek Bloku Radzieckiego
Abstrakt: Artykuł podejmuje proces neoliberalnej transformacji Bloku Radzieckiego 
z późnych lat osiemdziesiątych i wczesnych dziewięćdziesiątych analizując go na 
przykładzie Polski. Jego trajektoria ogólnie potwierdza tezę z artykułu Trzy kroki 
w stronę antropologii faktycznie istniejącego neoliberalizmu postawioną przez Loïca 




niż prostego demontażu czy osłabienia struktur państwowych i mechanizmów 
władzy. Autor pokazuje również, że przejściu od gospodarki planowanej do rynko-
wej w dawnym Bloku Radzieckim towarzyszyły (a w dużym stopniu w ogóle czyniły 
je możliwym) potężne działania ideologiczne, które przekształciły konstrukcje pod-
miotowości oraz sprawiły, że stała się kompatybilna z neoliberalnym kapitalizmem. 
Dowodzi to, że dwa tryby analizowania neoliberalizmu - strukturalna analiza władzy 
państwowej oraz skupienie na urządzaniu - powinny być traktowane jako komple-
mentarne narzędzia służące rozumieniu neoliberalnych transformacji. Jednakże, 
przeciwnie do Wacquanta, autor twierdzi, że pod tym względem nie ma nic nowego 
w neoliberalizmie jako praktyce, gdyż dla utrzymywania pozornej autonomii władzy 
rynku kapitalizm od zawsze wymagał pomocy ze strony państwa.
Słowa kluczowe: neoliberalizm, urządzanie, transformacja, przejście do kapitalizmu, 
Europa Środkowo Wschodnia, ideologia
